

**ATTACHMENT C
30 DAY FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM
CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES**

For CCHS Use Only:

Received By: _____
Date Received: _____
Incident Number: _____
Copied To: _____
Event Classification Level: _____

INSTRUCTIONS: This report is to be submitted for all Level 2 and 3 incidents or when requested by CCHS. See Attachment B-1 for suggestions regarding the type of information to be included in the report. Attach additional sheets as necessary. Forward the completed form to:

ATTENTION: Matt Kaufmann
Hazardous Materials Program Director
Contra Costa Hazardous Materials Programs
4585 Pacheco Boulevard, Suite 100
Martinez, CA 94553

INCIDENT DATE: 2/23/2021
INCIDENT TIME: Approximately 7:00 p.m.
FACILITY: Phillips 66 Rodeo Refinery

PERSON TO CONTACT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Steve Harms Phone number: (510) 245-4425

I. SUMMARY OF EVENT:

On February 23 at 10:58 a.m. the Rodeo Refinery initiated unit shutdown and refinery-wide stabilization activities as a result of an unplanned, sudden reduction of the primary hydrogen supply. The reduction in hydrogen was due to the third-party hydrogen plant (Air Liquide) unexpectedly shutting down. Refinery unit shutdown and idling activities include adjustments to feed and product storage tank functions.

At approximately 7:00 p.m. the Refinery shift organization was made aware of possible odors in the vicinity of the refinery. Reviews of process conditions indicated the release source was from the Tank 271 relief valve. Investigation and operational moves were made to stop the release and at approximately 10:00 p.m., flow into Tank 271 was diverted to alternate storage and the Tank 271 relief valve seated, stopping the release.

II. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION RESULTS

Is the investigation of the incident complete at this time? X Yes _____ No
If the answer is yes, complete the following:

III. SUMMARIZE INVESTIGATION RESULTS BELOW OR ATTACH COPY OF REPORT:

The Air Liquide trip was the initiating cause of all the Unit shutdowns and creation of off-grade material. Rundown from the Units was sent to alternative tankage as part of the Unit shutdown procedures, which included the Unit 244 rundown to Tank 271.

Tank 271 is a natural gas blanketed tank connected to the tank pressure control system and is equipped with dual pressure-vacuum relief safety valves (PSVs). During the investigation it was discovered that the Tank 271 PSVs were not set at 1.9 inH₂O and 2.2 inH₂O as designed. The PSVs were ordered new and replaced during the recent tank turnaround. When contacted as part of the investigation the manufacturer stated that PSVs are shipped with the weights removed and attached to the pallet for installation upon arrival, as movement during transfer can damage the PSV if the weights are installed. Because the PSVs were purchased new from the manufacturer they did not go through the Rodeo Valve Shop bench testing that is completed on reconditioned valves prior to installation on the tank. Had the new valves been inspected and tested at the Rodeo Refinery Valve Shop prior to installation the incorrect set pressure would have been discovered and corrected and the release would likely not have occurred during this upset condition.

IV. SUMMARIZE PREVENTATIVE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE INCLUDING MILESTONE AND COMPLETION DATES FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

Recommendation 1:

- The PSV was found to not have weights installed and so it lifted before set pressure. All new Tank PSVs will be inspected and bench tested at the Rodeo Refinery Valve Shop prior to installation.

Recommendation 2:

- Tank PSVs can be visually inspected in place to determine if weights are installed. Existing PSVs on storage tanks connected to the tank pressure control system will be visually inspected to verify the pressure and vacuum settings on the PSVs.